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Abstract. We consider variants of the classical stable marriage problem
in which preference lists may contain ties, and may be of bounded length.
Such restrictions arise naturally in practical applications, such as centralised
matching schemes that assign graduating medical students to their rst hos-
pital posts. In such a setting, weak stability is the most common solution
concept, and it is known that weakly stable matchings can have dierent
sizes. This motivates the problem of nding a maximum cardinality weakly
stable matching, which is known to be NP-hard in general. We show that this
problem is solvable in polynomial time if each man's list is of length at most 2
(even for women's lists that are of unbounded length). However if each man's
list is of length at most 3, we show that the problem becomes NP-hard and
not approximable within some  > 1, even if each woman's list is of length at
most 4.
Keywords: Stable marriage problem; ties; incomplete lists; NP-hardness;
polynomial-time algorithm
1 Introduction
The Stable Marriage problem (sm) was introduced in the seminal paper of Gale and
Shapley [3]. In its classical form, an instance of sm involves n men and n women,
each of whom species a preference list, which is a total order on the members of the
opposite sex. A matching M is a set of (man,woman) pairs such that each person
belongs to exactly one pair. If (m; w) 2 M , we say that w is m's partner in M , and
vice versa, and we write M(m) = w, M(w) = m.
We say that a person x prefers y to y0 if y precedes y0 on x's preference list.
A matching M is stable if it admits no blocking pair, namely a pair (m; w) such
that m prefers w to M(m) and w prefers m to M(w). Gale and Shapley [3] proved
that every instance of sm admits at least one stable matching, and described an
algorithm { the Gale / Shapley algorithm { that nds such a matching in time that
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is linear in the input size. In general, there may be many stable matchings (in fact
exponentially many in n) for a given instance of sm [13].
Incomplete lists. A variety of extensions of the basic problem have been studied.
In the Stable Marriage problem with Incomplete lists (smi), the numbers of men
and women need not be the same, and each person's preference list consists of a
subset of the members of the opposite sex in strict order. A pair (m; w) is acceptable
if each member of the pair appears on the preference list of the other. A matching
M is now a set of acceptable pairs such that each person belongs to at most one
pair. In this context, (m; w) is a blocking pair for a matching M if (a) (m; w) is
an acceptable pair, (b) m is either unmatched or prefers w to M(m), and likewise
(c) w is either unmatched or prefers m to M(w). As in the classical case, there is
always at least one stable matching for an instance of smi, and it is straightforward
to extend the Gale / Shapley algorithm to give a linear-time algorithm for this case.
Again, there may be many dierent stable matchings, but Gale and Sotomayor [4]
showed that every stable matching for a given smi instance has the same size and
matches exactly the same set of people.
Ties. An alternative extension of sm arises if preference lists are allowed to contain
ties. In the Stable Marriage problem with Ties (smt) each person's preference list
is a partial order over the members of the opposite sex in which indierence is
transitive. In other words, each person p's list can be viewed as a sequence of ties,
each of length  1; p prefers each member of a tie to everyone in any subsequent
tie, but is indierent between the members of any single tie. In this context, three
denitions of stability have been proposed [6, 11]. Among these three stability
criteria, it is weak stability that has received the most attention in the literature
[15, 18, 8, 7, 9, 10, 16, 17]. A matching M is weakly stable if there is no pair (m; w),
each of whom prefers the other to his/her partner in M . For a given instance of
smt, a weakly stable matching is bound to exist, and can be found in linear time
by breaking all ties in an arbitrary way (i.e. by strictly ranking the members of each
tie arbitrarily) and applying the Gale / Shapley algorithm.
Ties and incomplete lists. If we allow both of the above extensions of the
classical problem simultaneously, we obtain the Stable Marriage problem with Ties
and Incomplete lists (smti). In this context a matching M is weakly stable if there
is no acceptable pair (m; w), each of whom is either unmatched in M or prefers
the other to his/her partner in M . Once again, it is easy to nd a weakly stable
matching, merely by breaking all the ties in an arbitrary way and applying the
Gale / Shapley algorithm. However, the ways in which ties are broken will, in
general, aect the size of the resulting matching. It is therefore natural to consider
max smti, the problem of nding a maximum cardinality weakly stable matching
(henceforth a maximum weakly stable matching), given an instance of smti. max
smti turns out to be NP-hard, even under quite severe restrictions on the number
and lengths of ties [18]. Specically, NP-hardness holds even if ties occur in the
men's preference lists only, each tie is of length 2, and each tie comprises the whole
of the list in which it appears [18]. (Note that, in the smti instance constructed by
the reduction in [18], there are men with strictly ordered preference lists of length
at least 3.)
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The Hospitals/Residents problem. The Hospitals/Residents problem (hr) is a
many-to-one generalisation of smi, so called because of its application in centralised
matching schemes for the allocation of graduating medical students, or residents,
to hospitals [20]. The best known such scheme is the National Resident Match-
ing Program (NRMP) [19] in the US, but similar schemes exist in Canada [1], in
Scotland [12, 21], and in a variety of other countries and contexts. In fact, this
extension of sm was also discussed by Gale and Shapley under the name of the Col-
lege Admissions problem [3]. In an instance of hr, each resident has a preference
list containing a subset of the hospitals, and each hospital ranks the residents for
which it is acceptable. In addition, each hospital has a quota of available posts. In
this context, a matching is a set of acceptable (resident,hospital) pairs so that each
resident appears in at most one pair and each hospital in a number of pairs that
is bounded by its quota. The denition of stability is easily extended to this more
general setting (see [6] for details). It is again the case that every problem instance
admits at least one stable matching [3], and that all stable matchings have the same
size [4]. Clearly smi is equivalent to the special case of hr in which each hospital
has a quota of 1.
The Hospitals / Residents problem with Ties (hrt) allows arbitrary ties in the
preference lists. The denition of weak stability can be extended in a natural way
to the hrt context [14]. Since hrt is clearly an extension of smti, the hardness
results for weak stability problems in the latter extend to the former. These results
have potentially important implications for large-scale real-world matching schemes.
It is unreasonable to expect, say, a large hospital to rank in strict order all of its
many applicants, and any articial rankings, whether submitted by the hospitals
themselves, or imposed by the matching scheme administrators, may have signicant
implications for the number of residents assigned in a stable matching.
Bounded length preference lists. In the context of many large-scale matching
schemes, the preference lists of at least one set of agents tend to be short. For
example, until recently, students participating in the Scottish medical matching
scheme [12, 21] were required to rank just three hospitals in order of preference.
This naturally leads to the question of whether the problem of nding a maximum
weakly stable matching becomes simpler when preference lists on one or both sides
have bounded length.
Let (p; q)-max smti denote the restriction of max smti in which each man's
list is of length at most p and each woman's list is of length at most q. We use
p = 1 or q = 1 to denote the possibility that the men's lists or women's lists are of
unbounded length, respectively. Halldorsson et al. [7] showed that (4; 7)-max smti
is NP-hard and not approximable within some  > 1 unless P=NP. Halldorsson et al.
[9] gave an alternative reduction from Minimum Vertex Cover to max smti, showing
that the latter problem is not approximable within 21
19
unless P=NP. By starting from
the NP-hard restriction of Minimum Vertex Cover to graphs of maximum degree 3
[5], the same reduction shows NP-hardness for (5; 5)-max smti.
In this paper we consider other values of p and q, to narrow down the search
for the `borderline' between polynomial-time solvability and NP-hardness for (p; q)-
max smti. We show in Section 2 that (2;∞)-max smti is polynomial-time solvable
using a combination of an adapted version of the Gale / Shapley algorithm together
with a reduction to the Assignment problem. By contrast, in Section 3 we show
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that (3; 4)-max smti is NP-hard and not approximable within some  > 1 unless
P=NP. Finally, in Section 4 we present some concluding remarks.
2 Algorithm for (2,∞)-max smti
In this section we present a polynomial-time algorithm for max smti where the
preference lists of both men and women may contain ties, the men's lists are of
length at most 2 and the women's lists are of unbounded length. Let I be an
instance of this problem, where n1 and n2 are the numbers of men and women in I
respectively.
Consider the algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg shown in Figure 1. The algorithm
consists of three phases, where each phase is highlighted in the gure. We use the
term reduced lists to refer to participants' lists after any deletions made by the
algorithm. Phase 1 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is a simple extension of the Gale /
Shapley algorithm, and is used to delete certain (man,woman) pairs that can never
be part of any weakly stable matching. To \delete the pair (mi; wj)", we delete
mi from wj's list and delete wj from mi's list. Phase 1 proceeds as follows. All
men are initially unmarked. While some man mi remains unmarked and mi has a
non-empty reduced list, we set mi to be marked { it is possible that mi may again
become unmarked at a later stage of the execution. If mi's reduced list is not a tie
of length 2, we let wj be the woman in rst position in mi's reduced list. Then, for
each strict successor mk of mi on wj's list, we delete the pair (mk; wj) and set mk
to be unmarked (regardless of whether or not he was already marked).
We remark that the following situation may occur during phase 1. Suppose that
some man mi is indierent between two women wj and wk on his original preference
list, and suppose that during some iteration of the while loop he becomes marked.
We note that the algorithm does not delete the strict successors of mi on wj's list at
this stage. Now suppose that, during a subsequent loop iteration, the pair (mi; wk)
is deleted. Then mi becomes unmarked, only to be re-marked during a subsequent
loop iteration. This re-marking results in the deletions of all pairs (mr; wj), where
mr is a strict successor of mi on wj's list, as required.
In phase 2 we construct a weighted bipartite graph G and nd a minimum cost
maximum matching in G using the algorithm in [2]. The graph G is constructed
using Algorithm BuildGraph shown in Figure 2. That is, each man and woman is
represented by a vertex in G, and for each man mi on woman wj's reduced list, we
add an edge from mi to wj with cost rank(wj; mi), where rank(wj; mi) is the rank
of mi on wj's reduced list (i.e. 1 plus the number of strict predecessors of mi on wj's
reduced list). We then nd a minimum cost maximum matching MG in G.
In general, after phase 2, MG need not be weakly stable in I. In particular,
some man mi who has a reduced list of length 2 that is strictly ordered may be
assigned to his second-choice woman wk in MG, while his rst-choice woman wj
may be unassigned in MG. Clearly (mi; wj) blocks such a matching. To obtain a
weakly stable matching M from MG we execute phase 3. Initially M is set to be
equal to MG. Next, we move each such mi to his rst-choice woman. We note that
mi must be in the tail of wj's reduced list (this is the set of one or more entries tied
in last place on wj's reduced list) since mi must have been marked during Phase
1, causing all strict successors of mi on wj's list to be deleted. Further, we note
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/* Phase 1 */
set all men to be unmarked;
while (some man mi is unmarked and
mi has a non-empty reduced list) do
set mi to be marked;
if mi's reduced list is not a tie of length 2 then
wj := woman in rst position on mi's reduced list;
for each strict successor mk of mi on wj's list do
set mk to be unmarked;
delete the pair (mk; wj);
/* Phase 2 */
G := BuildGraph();
MG := minimum cost maximum matching in G;
/* Phase 3 */
M := MG;
while (there exists a man mi who is assigned
to his second-choice woman wk in M
and his rst-choice woman wj is unassigned in M) do
M := M \ {(mi; wk)};
M := M ∪ {(mi; wj)};
return M ;
Figure 1: Algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg.
that there may exist more than one such man in wj's tail who satises the above
criterion. Moreover when mi moves to wj, wk becomes unassigned in M . As a result,
there may be some other man mr (who strictly ranks wk in rst place) who now
satises the loop condition. This process is repeated until no such man exists. Upon
termination of phase 3 we will show that the matching M returned is a maximum
weakly stable matching.
We begin by showing that the algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg terminates. It is
easy to see that each of phases 1 and 2 is bound to terminate. The following lemma
shows that the same is true for phase 3.
Lemma 1. Phase 3 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg terminates.
Proof. We show that the while loop terminates during an execution E of phase 3.
For, at a given iteration of the while loop of phase 3, let mi be some man assigned
to his second-choice woman wk in M and suppose that his rst-choice woman wj is
unassigned in M , where mi's reduced list is of length 2 and is strictly ordered. Then
during E, mi switches from wk to wj. Hence each such mi must strictly improve
(in fact mi can only improve at most once). Therefore since the number of men is
nite, phase 3 is bound to terminate.
We next show that phase 1 of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable
pair, which is a (man,woman) pair that belongs to some weakly stable matching in
I.
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V := M∪W;
E := ∅;
for each man mi ∈M do
for each woman wj on mi's reduced list do
E := E ∪ {(mi; wj)};
cost(mi; wj) := rank(wj ;mi);
G := (V;E);
return G;
Figure 2: Algorithm BuildGraph.
Lemma 2. The algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg never deletes a weakly stable pair.
Proof. Let (mi; wj) be a pair deleted during an execution E of (2;∞)-max-smti-alg
such that (mi; wj) 2 M , where M is a weakly stable matching in I. Without loss
of generality suppose this is the rst weakly stable pair deleted during E. Then
mi was deleted from wj's list during some iteration q of the while loop of phase 1
during E. This deletion was made as a result of wj being in rst position in the
reduced list of some man mr, where mr's reduced list was not a tie of length 2, and
wj prefers mr to mi. Then in M , mr must obtain a woman ws whom he prefers to
wj, otherwise (mr; wj) blocks M . Therefore during E, (mr; ws) must have already
been deleted before iteration q, a contradiction.
Finally we prove that the matching returned by (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly
stable in I.
Lemma 3. The matching returned by algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-alg is weakly
stable in I.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that the matching M output by the algorithm
(2;∞)-max-smti-alg is not weakly stable. Then there exists a pair (mi; wj) that
blocks M . We consider the following four cases corresponding to a blocking pair.
Case (i): both mi and wj are unassigned in M . Then mi is unassigned in MG,
and either wj is unassigned in MG or becomes unassigned during phase 3. First
suppose that wj is unassigned in MG. Then the size of the matching MG could be
increased by adding the edge (mi; wj) to MG, contradicting the maximality of MG.
Now suppose that wj became unassigned as a result of phase 3. Let mp1 denote wj's
partner in MG. Then during phase 3, mp1 must have become assigned to his rst-
choice woman wq1. Suppose wq1 was unassigned in MG. Then we can nd a larger
matching by augmenting along the path (mi; wj); (wj; mp1); (mp1; wq1), contradicting
the maximality of MG. Therefore wq1 must have been assigned in MG and became
unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence the man mp2, to whom wq1 was assigned in
MG, switched to his rst-choice woman wq2. Using an argument similar to that above
for wq1, we can show that wq2 must be assigned in MG. Therefore some man switched
from wq2 during phase 3 to his rst-choice woman. If we continue this process, since
each man must strictly improve and the number of men is nite, there exists a nite
number of women that can become unassigned as a result of phase 3. Hence at
some point there exists a man mpr who switches to his rst-choice woman wqr and
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wqr was already unassigned in MG. We can then construct an augmenting path
in G of the form (mi; wj); (wj; mp1); (mp1; wq1); (wq1; mp2); (mp2; wq2); : : : ; (mpr ; wqr),
which contradicts the maximality of MG.
Case (ii): mi is unassigned in M and wj prefers mi to her assignee mk in M . Then
mi is unassigned in MG. Suppose that wj is assigned to mk in MG. As wj prefers
mi to mk, we could obtain a matching with a smaller cost, but with the same size,
by removing (mk; wj) and adding (mi; wj) to MG, a contradiction. Now suppose
that wj is not assigned to mk in MG. Then wj is either unassigned in MG or wj is
assigned in MG to mr, where mr 6= mk and mr 6= mi. If wj is unassigned in MG, we
contradict the maximality of MG. Now suppose wj is assigned to mr in MG. Then
since wj is no longer assigned to mr in M , mr must have switched to his rst-choice
woman ws during phase 3. Therefore either ws is unassigned in MG or ws became
unassigned as a result of some man switching from ws to his rst-choice woman.
Again using a similar argument to that in Case (i) we obtain an augmenting path
that contradicts the maximality of MG.
Case (iii): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers wj to ws and wj is unassigned
in M . Thus clearly mi's list is of length 2 and does not contain a tie, and wj is
mi's rst-choice woman. In this situation the loop condition of phase 3 is satised.
Therefore since the algorithm terminates (Lemma 1) this situation can never arise.
Case (iv): mi is assigned to ws in M and mi prefers wj to ws, and wj is assigned to
mr in M and wj prefers mi to mr. Thus again mi's list cannot contain a tie, and wj
is his rst-choice woman. Therefore either mi proposed to wj during phase 1 or wj
was deleted from mi's list. Hence mr would have been deleted from wj's list during
phase 1, so it is then impossible that (mr; wj) 2 M .
Since phase 1 of the algorithm never deletes a weakly stable pair (by Lemma 2),
a maximum weakly stable matching must consist of (man,woman) pairs that belong
to the reduced lists. We next note that G is constructed from the reduced lists, and
since we nd a maximum matching in G, the matching output by the algorithm
must indeed be a maximum weakly stable matching (by Lemma 3, and since phase
3 does not change the size of the matching output by the algorithm: every man
matched in MG is also matched in M).
The time complexity of the algorithm is dominated by nding the minimum cost
maximum matching in G = (V; E). The required matching in G can be constructed
in O(
p
jEjjV j log jV j) time [2]. Let n = jV j = n1 + n2. Since jEj  2n1 = O(n), it
follows that (2;∞)-max-smti-alg has time complexity O(n
3
2 log n).
We summarise the results of this section in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Given an instance I of (2;∞)-max smti, algorithm (2;∞)-max-smti-
alg returns a weakly stable matching of maximum size in O(n
3
2 log n) time, where
n is the total number of men and women in I.
3 NP-hardness of (3, 4)-max smti
In this section we show that, in contrast to the case for (2;∞)-max smti, (3; 4)-max
smti is NP-hard and not approximable within , for some  > 1, unless P=NP. Our
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proof involves a reduction from a problem involving matchings in graphs. A match-
ing M in a graph G is said to be maximal if no proper superset of M is a matching
in G. Dene min-mm to be the problem of nding a minimum cardinality maximal
matching, given a graph G. By [7, Theorem 1], min-mm is not approximable within
some 0 > 1 unless P=NP. The result holds even for subdivision graphs of cubic
graphs. (Given a graph G, the subdivision graph of G, denoted by S(G), is obtained
by subdividing each edge fu; wg of G in order to obtain two edges fu; vg and fv; wg
of S(G), where v is a new vertex.)
Theorem 5. (3; 4)-max smti is NP-hard and not approximable within , for some
 > 1, unless P=NP.
Proof. Let G be an instance of MIN-MM restricted to subdivision graphs of cu-
bic graphs. Then G = (U; W; E) is a bipartite graph where, without loss of gen-
erality, each vertex in U has degree 2 and each vertex in W has degree 3. Let
U = fm1; : : : ; msg and let W = fw1; : : : ; wtg. For each vertex mi 2 U , let Wi
denote the two vertices adjacent to mi in G. Similarly for each vertex wj 2 W , let
Uj denote the three vertices adjacent to wj in G. We construct an instance I of
(3; 4)-max smti as follows: let U [X be the set of men and let W [ Y be the set
of women, where X = fx1; : : : ; xtg and Y = fy1; : : : ; ysg. The preference lists of the
men and women in I are as follows:
mi : (Wi) yi (1  i  s) wj : (Uj) xj (1  j  t)
xi : wi (1  i  t) yj : mj (1  j  s)
In a given preference list, entries within round brackets are tied. Clearly the length of
each man's preference list is at most 3, whilst the length of each woman's preference
list is at most 4. We claim that s+(I) = s + t    1 (G), where s
+(I) denotes the
maximum size of a weakly stable matching in I and  1 (G) denotes the minimum
size of a maximal matching in G.
For suppose that G has a maximal matching M , where jM j =  1 (G). We
construct a matching M 0 in I as follows. Initially let M 0 = M . There remain s jM j
men in U that are unmatched in M 0; denote these men by mir (1  i  s   jM j),
and add (mir ; yir) to M
0 for each such mir . Finally there remain t   jM j women
in W that are unmatched in M 0; denote these women by wjr (1  r  t   jM j),
and add (xjr ; wjr) to M
0 for each such wjr . Clearly M
0 is a matching in I such that
jM 0j = jM j+ (s  jM j) + (t  jM j) = s + t   1 (G). It is straightforward to verify
that M 0 is weakly stable in I, and hence s+(I)  s + t   1 (G).
Conversely suppose that M 0 is a weakly stable matching in I, where jM 0j = s+(I).
Let M = M 0 \ E. The weak stability of M 0 in I implies that M is maximal in
G. Moreover, at most t   jM j women in W are matched in M 0 to men in X,
and at most s   jM j men in U are matched in M 0 to women in Y , and hence
jM 0j  jM j + (t   jM j) + (s   jM j) = s + t   jM j. Thus s+(I)  s + t    1 (G).
Hence the claim is established.
Theorem 1 of [7] shows that it is NP-hard to distinguish between the cases that
 1 (G)  c0m and 
 
1 (G) > 0c0m, where c0 > 0 is some constant and m = jEj.
Now if  1 (G)  c0m then s
+(I)  cs, whilst if  1 (G) > 0c0m then s
+(I) < cs,
where c = (5  6c0)=2 and  = (5  60c0)=(5  6c0). The result follows by Theorem
1 and Proposition 4 of [7].
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4 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have presented a polynomial-time algorithm for (2;∞)-max smti,
but have shown that, by contrast, (3; 4)-max smti is NP-hard and not approximable
within some  > 1. This leaves open the complexity of (3; 3)-max smti, the reso-
lution of which would shed further light on the boundary between polynomial-time
solvability and NP-hardness for variants of smti involving bounded-length prefer-
ence lists.
Another open problem concerns the complexity of (3;∞)-max smti where ties
belong to the preference lists of one sex only. Our reduction that establishes the
NP-hardness of (3; 4)-max smti introduces ties in the preference lists of both sexes.
However in many practical applications (such as assigning medical students to hos-
pitals), if the preference lists of one side (e.g. the residents) are short (as in the
SFAS application [21]), then it is reasonable for a matching scheme administrator
to insist that these lists should be strictly ordered. This motivates the consideration
of (3;∞)-max smti in which ties belong to the women's side only.
For those variants of (p; q)-max smti that are NP-hard, it remains to investigate
the existence of approximation algorithms for these problems that improve on the
performance guarantees of those that have already been formulated for the general
smti case (with no assumptions on the lengths of the preference lists) [18, 9, 16, 17].
Finally, the natural extension of (p; q)-max smti to the many-one hrt case may
be formulated: we denote this problem by (p; q)-max hrt. It remains to extend
the algorithm for (2;∞)-max smti to the case of (2;∞)-max hrt or prove that the
latter problem is NP-hard. Clearly Theorem 5 implies that (3; 4)-max hrt is also
NP-hard and not approximable within some  > 1.
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